Moldova's Pro-EU Party Wins Elections Despite Claims of Russian Interference
By Lily Nie
Edited by Laura Torres
Despite claims of Russian interference, the Moldovan 2025 parliamentary elections saw the victory of President Maia Sandu’s pro-European party, putting this former Soviet state one step closer to joining the European Union. According to Rainsford and Kirby, the elections had a turnout of 52.21%, higher than the previous years (BBC News). Out of the 15,787,25 votes counted, Sandu’s party, the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) had 50.2% of the vote, far surpassing Igor Dordon’s pro-Russian party, Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP), with only 24.2% of the votes ("Alegeri Parlamentare").
During a national address on the 22nd of September, six days before the parliamentary elections, Sandu warned the public of Russian interference. She stated; “sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and the European future are in danger. The Kremlin is pouring hundreds of millions of euros to buy hundreds of thousands of votes on both banks of the Nistru river and abroad. People are intoxicated daily with lies,” (“President Maia”).
Last year’s presidential elections were also ridden with reports of similar schemes, with individuals being paid around 34 euros to vote for parties in support of Russia and according to Police Chief Viorel Cernăuțeanu these came dangerously close to winning. Furthermore, it was calculated that Russia invested approximately 85,078,000 euros for the elections in the previous year, which has more than tripled this year (Rainsford). Nowadays, despite the increase in spending, the main focus has shifted from the simple bribery of votes to a larger, far more coordinated network working to sway the larger population’s opinions in the favour of pro-Russian parties (Rainsford). "In 2024 the focus of [Ilan Shor's] campaign was money. This year the focus is disinformation," says Cernăuțeanu (Rainsford).
In the days leading up to the vote more information surfaced in regards to Russia’s desperate attempts to restore their influence on the former Soviet state. Twelve men were accused of travelling to Serbia for firearms training and so were arrested. Their goal was to cause violent unrest back in Moldova (Marocico et al.). A Reuters investigation exposed that priests in Moldova have been treated to an all expenses trip to Russia in addition to receiving up to 1,200 euros in bribes (Lowe et al). For instance, Father Mihai Bicu, an Orthodox priest in Moldova and his fellow clergymen were treated to a trip to Russia. Here they received a series of lectures from theologians and historians that stressed the importance of the connection between Russia and Moldova and the significance of upholding those bonds in order to stand strong against a morally corrupt west. Upon their return, they were promised approximately 1,200 euros in exchange for the creation of social media accounts preaching the dangers of a pro-western government (Lowe et al.).
A BBC investigation also revealed that there was a network promising to pay voters 3000 Moldovan leu, translating to approximately 154 euros per month to spread pro-Russian propaganda online during the lead up to the elections (Marocico et al.).
Through undercover reporters and online forensics, BBC concluded that the network was made up of at least 90 TikTok accounts, with some even masquerading as news outlets. Since as early as January, these accounts have posted thousands of videos, which totalled around 23 million views, and approximately 860 thousand likes. However, after bringing this evidence to the Digital Forensics Research Lab, a deeper dive into the network revealed that the network was in fact a lot larger. According to the DFRLab, the broader network has amassed over 5.5 million views, as well as up to 2.2 million likes, far greater than their original findings. (Marocico et al.).
Moreover, this network was not just limited to posts spreading disinformation on social media. In addition to their online campaign of unrest, they also conducted illegal unofficial pollings under the name of a non-existent organisation. Participants were offered 200 Moldovan leu per hour, roughly 10 euros, to conduct interviews in Chișinău, the Moldovan capital, questioning citizens in regards to their preferred candidates in the upcoming elections. Prior to this, participants were also given training on how to subtly sway the interviewees, and asked to secretly tape those who voiced their support for the BEP. The goal of this data was to lay down the groundwork that could lead people to question the outcomes of the election if it did not turn out in their favour (Marocico et al.).
Nonetheless, when this plethora of evidence was brought forth, the Russian embassy in the UK denied any and all involvement, instead they flipped the accusation and insinuated that it was the European Union who had been behind the interference (Marocico et al.).
However, despite this decisive win by the PAS party, there are still long ways to go until European integration. The last country the EU admitted within their ranks was Croatia, who became a member state on July 1, 2013, 12 years ago. Additionally, EU accession talks have been stalled due to the veto from Kremlin-friendly Hungary over Ukraine’s treatment of their Hungarian minority. This affects Moldova as their applications for EU status, with Ukraine’s application took place four days after Russia’s invasion, and Moldova’s three days after, on March 3, 2022. They both gained EU candidate status concurrently, and their applications have been informally paired ever since (Jozwiak).
Earlier in 2025, a consultative referendum was held by the Central European country, in which 95 percent of European leadership voted against Ukrainian EU membership, indirectly affecting the application of Moldova (Jozwiak).
Bibliography:
Rainsford, Sarah, and Paul Kirby. "Moldova's Pro-EU Party Wins Vote Mired in Claims of Russian Interference." BBC, 28 Sept. 2025, www.bbc.com/news/ articles/cx2rdlj8ejgo. Accessed 6 Oct. 2025.
"Alegeri Parlamentare în Republica Moldova" ["Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Moldova"]. Comisia Electorală Centrală a Republicii Moldova, pv.cec.md/preliminare. Accessed 6 Oct. 2025.
”President Maia Sandu's Address in the Context of the Parliamentary Elections of September 28, 2025." Moldpres, 22 Sept. 2025, www.moldpres.md/eng/official/ adresarea-presedintei-maia-sandu-in-contextul-alegerilor-parlamentare-din-28-sept
embrie-2025-eng. Accessed 6 Oct. 2025.
Rainsford, Sarah. "Moldova Holds Key Election as Russia's Shadow Looms Large.” BBC, 27 Sept. 2025, www.bbc.com/news/articles/ c179z9d4vl1o?accountMarketingPreferences=off.
Marocico, Oana, et al. "How Russian-funded Fake News Network Aims to Disrupt European Election - BBC Investigation." BBC, 21 Sept. 2025, www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g5kl0n5d2o.
Lowe, Christain, et al. "Holy War: How Russia Recruited Orthodox Priests to Sway Moldova's Voters." Reuters, 26 Sept. 2025, www.reuters.com/investigations/ holy-war-how-russia-recruited-orthodox-priests-sway-moldovas-voters-2025-09-26/. Accessed 6 Oct. 2025.
Jozwiak, Rikard. "EU Decoupling Debate: Moldova and Ukraine's Path to Membership under Scrutiny." RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 8 Sept. 2025, www.rferl.org/ a/eu-decoupling-debate-moldova-ukraine-eu-membership/33524085.html. Accessed 6 Oct. 2025.
